A simple framework
In order to present an overview of this literature, and the papers contained in this volume, we construct a simple framework to analyze frictions in asset markets. The model speci…cation is a variation of Vayanos and Wang (2007), which itself builds upon Diamond (1982) and the follow-up literature. 1 We consider a continuous-time economy with a …xed supply, S, of trees that yield a constant ‡ow of fruits, d. At each point in time, there is a constant ‡ow, F , of potential buyers entering the economy. Buyers would like to hold one tree in order to consume its fruits. For tractability, trees are indivisible and agents cannot hold more than one tree. After a period of time of random length, exponentially distributed with mean 1= , an agent no longer wants to hold a tree: If she holds one, she incurs a ‡ow cost, . One common interpretation of this feature is that the agent receives a liquidity shock that makes her want to sell her asset. We will be more explicit about this liquidity shock in Section 5 when we formalize the role of assets as means of payment.
Alternatively, one could think of a change in agents'hedging needs requiring some portfolio rebalancing, as
in Du¢ e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2007) and Vayanos and Weill (2008) . What matters for our purpose is that this shock generates a ‡ow of agents who want to sell their assets. Once the asset has been sold, the agent leaves the economy permanently. 2 Trading frictions arise because …nding a trading partner takes time.
With some Poisson arrival rate, b , buyers …nd a seller and acquire the asset. Similarly, sellers …nd buyers 1 The methodology to formalize markets with bilateral matching and bargaining is reviewed in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) . Our model is related to the monetary models of Wright (1991, 1993) , Shi (1995) , and Trejos and Wright (1995) , the labor market model of Pissarides (2000) , the housing model of Wheaton (1990) , and the models of asset markets of Vayanos and Weill (2008) , Afonso (2008) , and Kim (2008 Kim ( , 2009 ). 2 Instead of having agents exiting permanently, we could assume that agents who exit the market can become buyers again in the future. For such a formulation see, e.g., Du¢ e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) .
with Poisson arrival rate, s . We will assume that agents are risk-neutral and discount future utility at rate r > 0. The ‡ows of agents in the economy are represented in Figure 1 . 
Buyers

Matching frictions
The …rst building block of the model is the description of the process through which buyers and sellers are brought together. In Harris's (2003, p.398) words:
"We can characterize the expected outcome of a search problem as a production function that explains how the inputs to the search are related to the expected products of the search."
This approach is similar to the one used by Pissarides (2000) to formalize search-matching activities in the labor market.
The matching function
Consider a market composed of b buyers and s sellers. Taking the search e¤orts of buyers and sellers as given, the inputs to the search problem are the numbers of buyers and sellers. The output is the number of matches that are formed. There are multiple reasons for why the matching process is not instantaneous.
Buyers and sellers might be heterogenous in terms of their portfolio needs; it takes time for an agent to locate someone on the other side of the market; buyers and sellers might be asymmetrically informed about the characteristics of the asset that is traded; the arrivals of buyers and sellers in a marketplace are not synchronized; there are technological constraints that prevent all orders from being matched instantly.
It is common to summarize these trading frictions using a reduced-form matching function, M ( b ; s ), which speci…es the number of trading opportunities per unit of time. The parameter is a scaling variable, which determines the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The matching function is continuous and increasing with respect to each of its arguments, and equal to 0 when one side of the market has no agent, i.e., when b = 0 or s = 0. In labor-market applications, empirical evidence has convinced many researchers that M ( b ; s ) has constant returns to scale (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001 ). For housing and …nancial markets, however, as of now there is no compelling empirical evidence that the constant-returns assumption should (or should not) apply. 3 In some markets, observable trading mechanics are naturally represented by more speci…c matching technologies. 4 For instance, in the housing market, search frictions are well described by a stock- ‡ow matching process (Taylor, 1995; Coles and Smith, 1998; Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2006) . In the context of the housing market, a stock- ‡ow matching process assumes that a new buyer …rst inspects all the houses that are on sale. If he …nds a house he likes, he is instantly matched. Otherwise, he has to enter the stock of unmatched buyers and wait until new vacant houses are put on the market. A similar matching process arises in limit order books (Rosu, 2009; Biais, Hombert, and Weill, 2010) . For instance, a new limit order to buy can be immediately executed if its limit price is high enough to be matched with a limit-sell order stocked in the book. Otherwise, the new limit order is stocked in the book until some other trader places a low enough limit-sell order.
Trading frictions can also be explained by informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers regarding the quality of assets. 5 There can be assets of di¤erent qualities, and the holder of the asset might be better informed about the characteristics of his assets (e.g., its future cash ‡ows Matching frictions are also generated by the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers. Agents might value the asset di¤erently depending on their liquidity and hedging needs, or they can have di¤erent rates of time preference or di¤erent costs of participating in the market. While in our simple model we do not take this heterogeneity explicitly into account, it is certainly an important aspect of the search-and-matching frictions that characterize some asset markets and a key determinant of the supply and demand for liquidity. Such two-sided heterogeneity has been shown to matter for the extent to which the market is segmented (e.g., 
Time in the market
Let us go back to our model with the reduced-form matching function, M ( b ; s ). It can be used to construct the expected times that buyers and sellers spend in the market. Time is taken to be continuous, and the time spent in the market for buyers and sellers is characterized by Poisson processes with respective arrival rates:
Assuming for simplicity that the matching function has constant returns to scale, the matching rates depend as ! 1. Likewise, the assumption that M ( b ; s ) is increasing in both arguments means that ( ) is increasing, while ( )= is decreasing. 8 If the matching technology exhibits increasing returns to scale then the matching rates depend not only on the composition of the market but also on its size.
The measures of buyers and sellers are endogenous. Let o denote the measure of asset owners who are not seeking to sell their asset. The ‡ows in and out of the buyer, owner, and seller states obey the ordinary di¤erential equations:
According to the right side of (1) . In equilibrium, the measure of agents holding an asset, o + s , must equal the …xed stock of the asset, S. If the matching function has constant returns to scale, this market-clearing condition can be rewritten as:
and it determines a unique ratio of buyers per seller, . It can be checked that decreases with S and , and it increases with F . In the case where F > S, also increases with . The volume of trades is ( ) s , and the turnover of the asset is ( ) s =S.
It is useful to consider the frictionless limiting economy as the e¢ ciency of the matching process becomes in…nite, ! 1. Consider the case when F > S: i.e., the total measure of traders who would be happy to own, F= , is greater than the asset supply, S. From (4), one easily veri…es that as the matching e¢ ciency goes to in…nity, ! 1, the number of buyers per seller goes to in…nity, ! 1, and the matching rate of sellers goes to in…nity as well, s ! 1. Therefore, in the frictionless limit, sellers can sell their asset instantly. Buyers, on the other hand, must wait until asset owners receive a preference shock and sell their is the measure of buyers, i.e., the measure, F= , of agents who would be happy to own an asset, minus the measure, S, of agents who actually own one. Thus, buyers'search times adjusts so that the ‡ow of buyers who buy the asset is exactly equal to the ‡ow of assets, S, put on the market by owners who receive a preference shock.
Asset prices
The second building block of the model is the collection of values (lifetime maximum expected utility) of buyers, owners, and sellers at a steady state. These solve the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations:
According to the right side of (5), a buyer …nds a seller with Poisson arrival rate b , in which case she pays the price p to purchase the asset and makes a transition to the owner state. On the other hand, with Poisson arrival rate, , the buyer no longer wants to hold the asset and leaves the market. The other Bellman equations have similar interpretations.
From (5), the buyer's surplus from a trade is p + V o V b , while from (7), the seller's surplus is p V s .
So the total match surplus is
It is the value of an owner minus the values of a buyer and a seller. Substracting (5) and (7) from (6) and rearranging, we …nd that the total surplus of a match is
where and 1 are the respective fractions of the match surplus appropriated by the buyer and the seller, usually interpreted as their respective bargaining powers. 9 From (8) the match surplus is proportional to the holding cost, . More precisely, it can be interpreted as the present value of the holding cost that would be incurred by the seller in case trade does not occur until either: the buyer loses her desire to 9 Because of the bilateral monopoly problem between the buyer and the seller, there are many ways one could split the match surplus. In over-the-counter markets, prices are usually determined through a bargaining process between the buyer and the A convenient expression for the asset price is found by subtracting (5) and the identity rp = rp from (6):
which implies
The …rst term is standard: It is the ‡ow dividend payment, which is capitalized in the asset price. The second and the third terms arise because of search-and-matching frictions. The second term is a liquidity discount because, with intensity , a buyer who receives a preference shock no longer wants to hold the asset and, as a consequence, the match surplus, , is lost. The third term is a bargaining discount, because the buyer is able to extract a fraction, , of the surplus from the seller. So this simple model delivers a rich theory of asset prices that depend on the structure of the market, which includes the matching technology and agents' bargaining powers. In the context of the housing market Caplin and Leahy (2010, this issue)
show that such a model of trade with matching frictions can generate the large price changes and the positive correlation between prices and sales that we see in the data.
Let us consider the limit of the asset price when trading frictions vanish. 10 As before, suppose that F > S; i.e., the market is a seller's market. Then, s ! 1, and b stays bounded. From (8) , as long as
Our model can be used to analyze traditional measures of transaction costs, such as bid-ask spreads.
For this, consider the payo¤-equivalent economy in which the buyer's bargaining power is a random variable with support [0; 1] and mean , independently distributed across encounters. Then, the maximum buying price (the ask) is p a = V o V b and the minimum selling price (the bid) is p b = V s . The bid-ask spread is then equal to the total match surplus:
The bid-ask spread is proportional to the seller's cost of holding the asset, . But if the matching process becomes in…nitely e¢ cient and b + s (1 ) = 1, then the bid-ask spread vanishes.
Because it assumes that only one asset is traded, the above model analyzes the impact of liquidity on asset prices only by comparative statics, and thus cannot explain why assets may di¤er in their liquidity in the …rst place. Vayanos and Wang (2007) , Vayanos and Weill (2008) , and Weill (2008) provide multi-asset models starting from the assumption that all asset markets share the same matching technology. Liquidity and price di¤erences arise endogenously in equilibrium as a consequence of investors'optimal search behavior, and can be related to asset fundamental characteristics. We will revisit this theme in Section 5 when we endogeneize the role that assets play to facilitate exchange.
So far, the price of the asset is determined by investors themselves. In many markets, prices are set by some intermediaries (e.g., brokers or dealers Li (1998) . The model can then provide a natural de…nition of the bid-ask spread as the di¤erence between the price at which intermediaries sell the asset and the price at which they buy it.
We have assumed that the asset price was determined through a negotiation. Alternatively, prices can be posted by some market makers. If investors di¤er in terms of their information about the prices in the market-some investors are sophisticated while others are unsophisticated-then, following the logic in Burdett and Judd (1983) , the model is able to predict a distribution of posted prices. This is consistent with the …nding of Green, Holli…eld, and Schurho¤ (2007) for the market of municipal bonds.
For simplicity, we have restricted agents'asset holdings to f0; 1g. This assumption is made for tractability and is common in the literature, dating back to Diamond (1982) Suppose that agents di¤er in terms of their participation costs in the market. These costs represent the opportunity costs of giving up investment opportunities in other markets. Let F (c) denote the ‡ow of agents with an entry cost less than c and assume, to simplify the analysis, that the entry cost is paid once and for all upon entry. An agent is willing to enter the market if her entry cost is smaller than some threshold c R .
Hence, the ‡ow of participating agents is F (c R ), and from (4),
which gives an increasing relationship between the ratio of buyers to sellers, , and the threshold for the entry cost below which agents enter, c R . Intuitively, if c R increases, then there is larger ‡ow of buyers entering the market, which must be balanced by a larger out ‡ow of sellers in a steady state; i.e., increases.
Buyers at the threshold entry cost must be indi¤erent between entering or not; i.e., V b = c R . From (5) and (8), this indi¤erence condition can be written as
This de…nes a decreasing relationship between c R and . Intuitively, if the ratio of buyers to sellers increases, then buyers have a harder time …nding sellers and so they are willing to incur smaller entry costs.
The two relationships (10) and (11), labelled "steady state" and "entry," respectively, in Figure 2 , uniquely de…ne the equilibrium values of c R and .
This simple model can be used to study how changes in fundamentals a¤ect participation decisions.
Suppose, for instance, that sellers' cost of holding the asset, , increases. Graphically, the entry curve in So far, we have only considered a participation decision on the buyer's side. We could make the buyer's decision to sell her assets endogenous as well. One could assume, for instance, that the cost of holding the asset, , follows a stochastic process. When this cost is su¢ ciently high, sellers would choose to participate in order to sell their assets.
A natural question is whether agents'participation decisions (and hence "funding" liquidity) are socially e¢ cient. By participating in the market, a buyer reduces the search times of potential sellers; this is a thick market externality. But the new entrant reduces the search times of other buyers; this is a congestion externality (Afonso, 2008) . As it has been well-known since Hosios (1990) , in environments where prices are set through bargaining, these externalities in general do not cancel out and participation is socially ine¢ cient. 
of the matches. Since the buyer's share in the match surplus is , the social and private gains from buyers' participation coincide if = 0 ( ) = ( ); i.e., the buyer's surplus share must re ‡ect her contribution to the matching process. 11 If this condition is not satis…ed, then participation is socially ine¢ cient, and Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are welfare improving.
Alternatively, these externalities can be internalized by requiring that prices be set in advance and be made publicly available. This notion of equilibrium, …rst formalized by Moen (1997) , is called competitive search equilibrium. 12 Suppose, for instance, that sellers can post the price at which they commit to sell their asset. Buyers can observe all the posted prices and direct their search toward the price of their choosing.
We can then de…ne a submarket as a subset of sellers posting a price and a subset of buyers looking for that price. On each submarket there are search frictions as described earlier. When setting their prices sellers take into account that the buyer-to-sellers ratio in the submarket, (p), will adjust so that buyers are indi¤erent between searching in that submarket and searching in a di¤erent one. The seller's problem can then be written as:
where the seller takes as given the buyer's values V b and V o of searching in other submarkets and of becoming an owner. Equation (13), which gives a decreasing relationship between and p, captures the key trade-o¤ faced by the seller: If she increases her price, p, then decreases; i.e., her market is less attractive to buyers, and she has to accept longer search times.
One can use (13) to obtain an expression for ( )p as a function of . Plugging this expression into the seller's objective, (12) , to eliminate p, and taking derivatives with respect to leads to the …rst-order condition: or, equivalently,
The price is the one that would prevail in an economy with ex-post bargaining, where the buyer's bargaining power corresponds to the contribution that a marginal buyer makes to the matching process, as measured by 0 ( ) = ( ). As argued above, in this case, participation decisions are socially e¢ cient.
The competitive search equilibrium is also convenient for discussing how investors'heterogeneity a¤ects participation. Suppose, for instance, that there are two types of buyers with di¤erent participation costs.
The market will then be endogenously segmented, with one submarket for buyers with a low participation cost and a di¤erent submarket for buyers with a high participation cost. In the submarket where buyers have a high participation cost, the price will be high but will be low to reduce buyers'search times.
Another approach to endogenize the ease of trading is to explicitly model …nancial intermediation. For instance, dealers could choose the intensity with which they match buyers and sellers (Du¢ e, Gârleanu, 
Liquidity and payments
So far we have captured a motive for trading the asset by introducing idiosyncratic shocks that a¤ect agents' utility ‡ow from holding the asset. In the following we will be more explicit and we will assume the asset can be used to …nance random spending opportunities, as in the monetary models of Shi (1995) , Trejos and Wright (1995) , and Wallace (1996 Wallace ( , 2000 . In contrast with the previous section, this model gives rise to a liquidity premium (instead of a liquidity discount), which capitalizes the transaction services provided by the asset in the presence of search frictions.
Consider the same environment as before with two consumption goods: the fruits produced by the asset, and a consumption good traded in a bilateral match between a consumer and a producer, call it a search good. There is ‡ow F of agents who enter the economy with a single opportunity to produce search goods.
They will search for a consumer and trade their output for an asset that they can spend later in their lives when it is their turn to consume. The search good is perfectly divisible and perishable, and consumption and production take place on the spot. After having produced, an agent has the desire to consume after a period of random length exponentially distributed with mean 1= . In order to produce q 2 R + units of the search good, the producer incurs a disutility cost q. The consumption of q units generates u(q) in terms of utility, where u( ) has the usual properties. After having consumed, the agent leaves the economy permanently. We assume that agents cannot commit and that there is no record-keeping of individual trades. As shown by Kocherlakota (1998) , in such an economy there is an essential role for an asset as a medium of exchange.
The distribution of agents across states ( b , o , s ) and the matching rates are determined as before.
Let us turn to the determination of the output traded in bilateral meetings, q. The ‡ow Bellman equations
According to (14) a buyer of the asset, who is also a producer of the search good, meets a seller at rate b .
The buyer produces q units of the consumption good in exchange for the asset. According to (15) , an agent with no production opportunity and no desire to consume the search good enjoys only the consumption of the fruits generated by his asset. With Poisson arrival rate , he receives a preference shock and wishes to consume the search good. According to (16) the seller of the asset enjoys the dividend ‡ow, d, and meets a buyer at rate s . He receives q units of the consumption good, valued according to the utility function u(q), in exchange for his asset, and he leaves the market permanently.
How is q determined? As before, we will assume that the output a unit of asset buys is determined through bargaining. Suppose …rst that the buyer of the asset has all the bargaining power. The seller of the asset is indi¤erent between selling or not selling so that u(q) = V s and V s = V o = d=r. The value from holding the asset corresponds to its fundamental value. In particular, if the dividend goes to 0, then the value of the asset is 0. The asset has no purchasing power, q = 0, and agents obtain no more than their
Suppose next that the seller of the asset has all the bargaining power. Then, the buyer of the asset is indi¤erent between buying or not buying so that q = V o and V b = 0. From (15) and (16) the purchasing power of the asset is determined by
The solution to (17) is represented in Figure 3 where "RHS"corresponds to the right side of (17) and "LHS" corresponds to the left side. If agents receive no spending shock, = 0, then the asset is priced at its fundamental value, q = d=r. In contrast, if the asset is useful as a means of payment, then its price rises above the fundamental value q = d=r. Because of its moneyness, the asset acquires a "liquidity premium" or a "convenience yield" (Cochrane, 2005) . To see this, consider the limit case when d tends to 0 and the real asset approaches a …at money. Although the asset pays no dividend, it still has a positive value in exchange when > 0, i.e., to the extent it helps …nance agents'needs to consume the search good. Graphically, the right side of (17) is represented by the dashed curve in Applying a similar calculation to Treasuries, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen found that "the value 1 3 For a survey of this new generation of monetary models, see Williamson and Wright (2010) . The simple model we described above has a single asset that can serve as medium of exchange. A central objective of monetary theory, however, is to explain which asset among multiple assets will serve as money to facilitate trades. From Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), we learned that fundamental features of supply and demand, social conventions, and the properties of assets matter for the moneyness of an asset.
The relationship between the physical properties of an asset (cash ‡ow, divisibility, storage cost) and its moneyness has been investigated further by Wallace (2000) , who develops a theory of the liquidity structure of asset yields based on indivisibility. Financial economists often relate asset liquidity to the extent of asymmetric information about cash ‡ows. Two papers in this issue embed this idea into search models and investigate the manner in which an asset's "recognizability" a¤ects its liquidity. 14 Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2010) show that assets that exist in di¤erent qualities and that lack recognizability might not be acceptable in decentralized trades. Cavalcanti and Nosal (2010, this issue) use a version of the model above to study the counterfeiting of currency when agents are heterogenous in terms of their ability to produce counterfeits and show, using a mechanism design approach, that it is not e¢ cient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely.
If di¤erent assets have di¤erent liquidity properties, they should also have di¤erent rates of return. To the extent that monetary theory can help explain liquidity di¤erences across assets, it can also help explain seemingly anomalous rate-of-return di¤erences, such as the rate-of-return-dominance puzzle, or the equitypremium and risk-free-rate puzzles. The rate-of-return-dominance puzzle is about the observation that individuals hold money instead of interest-bearing assets. This puzzle has been studied in the context of The search paradigm o¤ers a natural framework for thinking about the trading frictions prevailing in credit markets. Diamond (1987 Diamond ( , 1990 ) and Shi (1996) trade in bilateral matches and are subject to a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. There is no currency, but there is a payments system that can record individual transactions and assign balances to its participants.
The model is used to determine the optimal settlement frequency and the trade-o¤ between trade sizes and settlement frequency. Afonso and Shin (2010, this issue) construct a model of a payment system calibrated to reproduce features of the US Fedwire system and study its ability to withstand severe payment disruptions.
They show that individually cautious behavior can accumulate into a signi…cant and detrimental impact on the overall functioning of the payment system.
Conclusion
We provided an overview of the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both …nance and monetary theory using a simple search-theoretic model. By taking explicitly into account trade mechanics, search-theoretic models provide a natural platform to investigate various notions of liquidity. From the matching technology, one can explain trading delays and the volume of trade or, in a monetary context, the velocity of the asset. Using various pricing mechanisms (e.g., price posting, bargaining) and alternative assumptions about traders'information, one can obtain rich predictions for bid and ask prices. The search approach also has novel predictions for asset prices, which depend not only on the streams of dividends but also on trading frictions and buyers'and sellers'bargaining powers. In monetary environments asset prices can also exhibit liquidity premia, which can help explain various asset-pricing anomalies. Finally, the model makes it possible to discuss positive and normative aspects of liquidity provision, including participation in the market, market-making and intermediation, and monetary policy.
